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If we think of a possible world as representing a way things can be, an impossible
world represents a way in which things cannot be. The importance of impossible
worlds has been discussed in recent literature.1 One reason for accepting impossi-
ble worlds comes from counterfactual reasoning (Nolan (1997), Routley (1989)).
Consider, for instance, the following counterfactual: if someone were to square
a circle, she or he would be famous. This counterfactual has an impossible an-
tecedent. One way to analyse such a counterfactual is to invoke an impossible
world where someone does square a circle and evaluate the consequent at the
world or a set of worlds that is or are the closest to that impossible world.
But what exactly are impossible worlds? What does it mean to talk about ways
in which things cannot be? There are several formulations of impossible worlds in
the literature.2 Some characterise the impossibility of impossible worlds in terms
of logic. There have been mainly three ways in which impossible worlds are
characterised in logical terms. First, an impossible world is a world where A∧¬A
is true for some A (Lycan (1994)). According to this view, an impossible world is
a world where some contradiction obtains. Second, an impossible world is a world
that is governed by some non-classical logic (Cresswell (1973)). According to this
second formulation, it is assumed that classical logic holds at the actual world, and
a world is impossible if the laws of classical logic fail. Because of the assumption
1For a survey, see Berto (2013) §1.
2See Berto (2013), Jago (2015), Nolan (2013).
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that the actual world is governed by classical logic, this means that an impossible
world is a world where the laws of logic are different. Third, an impossible world
is a world where the laws of logic fail (Priest (2008): 172).3
The first and the second formulations of impossible worlds in terms of logic
give us an insight into what an impossible world might be like. If impossibility is
characterised in terms of contradictions, an impossible world is contradictory. It
might be a world where Sylvan’s Box, a box which is both empty and nonempty,
exists (Priest (1997)). An impossible world in this sense might be a world which
is governed by some paraconsistent logic, or classical logic if it is also a trivial
world where everything is true. If an impossible world is a world which is gov-
erned, for instance, by intuitionistic logic, it is a world where mathematics is done
intuitionistically. At such a world, a mathematician cannot rely on the Law of
Excluded Middle to prove anything.4 But what does it mean for the laws of logic
to fail?
My task in this paper is to answer this question. I will use the resources that
Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant log-
ics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I will claim that the non-normal
worlds that Routley/Sylvan (with his collaborators) introduced are exactly such
worlds.5 To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I will call such
worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws of
logic fail. In this paper, I will provide a definition of logically impossible worlds.
I will then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds.
2 Logically Impossible Worlds
We can define logically impossible worlds by elaborating on some features of the
semantics for relevant logics that were introduced by Routley/Sylvan (with his
collaborators). For simplicity, I consider the simplified semantics for the relevant
logic B (Priest and Sylvan (1992)). The semantics for B is a structure 〈W,N,R, I〉
where W is a set of worlds, N is a set of normal worlds, R ⊂ W ×W ×W, and I
is a map from propositions to worlds. R at normal worlds satisfies the normality
condition:
3As we will see later, Priest (2008) equates a world where the laws of logic fail with a world
where the laws of logic are different. In the last section of this paper, I will argue that that is a
mistake.
4See Detlefsen (1990) for gaining an understanding of what that world might be like.
5Nolan (2013) makes a brief suggestion along this line (p. 361) but no sustained discussion has
been given in the literature as far as I know.
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〈w,w′,w′′〉 ∈ R iff w′ = w′′ for every w ∈ N and every w′,w′′ ∈ W.
In other words, R at normal worlds is binary and at non-normal world is ternary.
For the sake of illustration, I will consider a so-called relational semantics and
assume an evaluation of propositions to be not a function but a relation between
a proposition and a value. So I maps a proposition, p, to an extension Ep (the
set of worlds where p is true) and an anti-extension Ap (the set of worlds where
p is false), i.e., I(p) = 〈Ep, Ap〉. A two-valued semantics requires the Routley-
star operation to specify the truth condition for negation. As will become clear,
however, negation is not what is at issue in defining logically impossible worlds.
In order to focus on the main issue, I will examine a relational semantics.6
An evaluation of a proposition, ρ, can be given as:
〈p, 1〉 ∈ ρw iff w ∈ Ep.
〈p, 0〉 ∈ ρw iff w ∈ Ap.
Evaluations of complex formulas involving conjunction and disjunction also come
in two clauses: one for extension and another for anti-extension.
Our main interest is with conditionals as an examination of conditionals can
give us a definition of logically impossible worlds. Conditionals are evaluated in
terms of ternary relations:
〈A→ B, 1〉 ∈ ρw iff for every w′,w′′ ∈ W such that 〈w,w′,w′′〉 ∈ R, if
〈A, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ then 〈B, 1〉 ∈ ρw′′ .
〈A → B, 0〉 ∈ ρw iff for some w′,w′′ ∈ W such that 〈w,w′,w′′〉 ∈ R,
〈A, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ and 〈B, 0〉 ∈ ρw′′ .
Because of the normality condition, the evaluations of conditionals at normal
worlds can be simplified as:
〈A→ B, 1〉 ∈ ρw iff for every w′ ∈ W, if 〈A, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ then 〈B, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ .
〈A→ B, 0〉 ∈ ρw iff for some w′ ∈ W, 〈A, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ and 〈B, 0〉 ∈ ρw′ .
Validity is then defined in terms of truth-preservation at all normal worlds:
Σ |= A iff for every 〈W,N,R, I〉 and every w ∈ N, if 〈B, 1〉 ∈ ρw for
every B ∈ Σ, then 〈A, 1〉 ∈ ρw.
6The relevant logic based on a relational semantics is, in fact, not the same as B. The relational
semantics generates a logic that does not validate contraposition whereas B does. For details, see
Restall (1995).
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Note that because we have a relational semantics, falsity does not exclude the
sentence being true as well. In order to show that a conditional, for instance A→
B, fails to be a logical truth at a world, we need to demonstrate not that it is false,
〈A→ B, 0〉 ∈ ρw, but that it fails to be true at that world, i.e., 〈A→ B, 1〉 < ρw.
Now, a conditional is said to be relevant if the antecedent and the consequent
share some propositional variables. For a conditional to be a logical truth of rele-
vant logics, it must be relevant. The following conditionals fail to be logical truths
according to relevant logics: A→ (B ∨ ¬B), (A ∧ ¬A)→ B, and A→ (B→ B).
The first conditional (A → (B ∨ ¬B)) can be invalidated by allowing some
worlds to be incomplete: neither B nor ¬B are true. If A is true at such an
incomplete world, the antecedent of the conditional (A) is true but the conse-
quent (B ∨ ¬B) is not true at that world. So, for some w′ ∈ W, 〈A, 1〉 ∈ ρ′w but
〈B∨ ¬B, 1〉 < ρ′w. Hence, for some normal world w ∈ N, 〈A→ (B∨ ¬B), 1〉 < ρw.
Once we introduce incomplete worlds to the set of worlds, the conditional can be
shown to be invalid.
The second conditional ((A ∧ ¬A) → B) can be invalidated in terms of incon-
sistent worlds where both A and ¬A are true. If B is not true at such an inconsistent
world, the conditional can be shown to be not true. Suppose that 〈A∧¬A, 1〉 ∈ ρw′
for some w′ ∈ W. If 〈B, 1〉 < ρw′ , then 〈A ∧ ¬A, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ and 〈B, 1〉 < ρw′ for some
w′ ∈ W. So, for some normal world w ∈ N, 〈(A ∧ ¬A) → B), 1〉 < ρw. So the
conditional is invalid.
From the perspective of relevant logics, it is the third conditional, A → (B →
B), that is the most interesting. In most relevant logics, B → B comes out to
be a logical truth. For every w′ ∈ W, if 〈B, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ then 〈B, 1〉 ∈ ρw′ . So
〈B→ B, 1〉 ∈ ρw for any w ∈ N. Hence the conditional is valid. So A→ (B→ B)
has a consequent that is a logical truth. This is where the distinction between
normal and non-normal worlds becomes important.
Routley and Routley (1972) developed semantics for First Degree Entailment
(FDE). FDE is a conditional-free fragment of (full) relevant logics. When Routley
and Meyer (1972, 1973) extended the Routley-Routley semantics to (full) relevant
logics, they held that the real world must be among the worlds that has a ‘privi-
leged status’ (Routley and Meyer (1973): 205). To identify a privileged world,7
Routley and Meyer introduced non-normal worlds which do not have such a sta-
tus. The introduction of non-normal worlds allowed them to invalidate irrelevant
conditionals such as A→ (B→ B).
7There may be more than one privileged world. But completeness requires there to be only one
such world.
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At a non-normal world, the truth value of a conditional, A → B, is not deter-
mined by the truth values of A and B at the same world. It is determined by those
values at different worlds that are related in a ternary manner. What is important
here is not the ternary relations but the fact that the antecedent and the consequent
are evaluated at different worlds. That allows a non-normal world to make B→ B
come out not true.
But, as we saw above, B → B is a logical truth in the system. Non-normal
worlds are parts of the structure that validate B → B as a logical truth. Yet it is
at these worlds that B → B fails to be true. So, a non-normal world is part of the
structure that defines the logical truths of the system but it is a world where those
very logical truths fail to hold.
It can now be shown that a non-normal world is a world where the laws of logic
fail and is, thus, a logically impossible world. Consider a conditional A → B
where A and B do not contain any conditionals. The semantics for FDE is a
systematic account of the truth-preserving relationship between the antecedent,
A, and the consequent, B. It was developed to study the relationship between
A and B in terms of A |= B. When it is extended to (full) relevant logics, the
analysis of the relation between A and B is used to study the conditional A → B
in terms of |= A → B. This means that if A → B is a logical truth, the conditional
expresses the validity of the truth-preserving relation between the antecedent and
the consequent. In other words, in relevant logic, a logical truth in the form of
conditional expresses a law of logic.
There is then a sense in which logical truths of conditional form express the
laws of logic. And non-normal worlds introduced to the semantics of relevant
logic are exactly the worlds where the laws of logic, understood as above, fail.
They are logically impossible worlds. Thus, once we define logically impossible
worlds in terms of non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan (with his collaborators)
introduced to invalidate irrelevant conditionals such as A→ (B→ B), we can gain
a clear understanding of what makes a world logically impossible.
3 Non-Normal Worlds
There is nothing strange or mysterious about logically impossible worlds as I
characterised them above. Such worlds are part of the semantic resources that
Kripke (1963, 1965) introduced for the systems of modal logic developed by
C.I. Lewis (especially for S2 and S3) and E.J. Lemmon (especially E2 and E3).
This means that logically impossible worlds have been with us since the beginning
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of possible worlds semantics.8
Among the systems of modal logic are S2 and S3 as well as E2 and E3, the
so-called non-normal systems. The main characteristic of non-normal systems is
the failure of necessitation: it is not the case that if |= A then |= A. In order to
develop semantics for these systems, Kripke introduced non-normal worlds where
A fails to hold for any A. Once we have these worlds, even if |= (A ∨ ¬A) (as
A ∨ ¬A is true at every world), 6|= (A ∨ ¬A).
To make things more precise, let 〈W,N,R, ν〉 be a structure where W is a set
of worlds, N is a set of normal worlds, R ⊂ W × W and ν is an evaluation of
propositions at a world. For simplicity, we assume R to be universal. For any A
and any w ∈ W − N, νw(A) = 0.
Validity can be defined in two ways. First, it can be defined in terms of all
normal worlds. Let’s call such validity weak validity and represent it as |=w. This
gives rise to a Lewis non-normal system. Second, validity can be defined in terms
of all worlds. Let’s call it strong validity and represent it as |=s. This gives rise to
a Lemmon system of modal logic.9
Logical truths are special cases of validity. So A is a weak logical truth, |=w,
if A is true at every normal world in every model. A strong logical truth, |=s, is
defined in terms of all worlds. So |=s A if A is true at every world in every model.
Let’s define the generality of logic in terms of the claim that a logical truth
expresses a truth no matter what the situation turns out to be. So to say that the
necessity of A is general is to say that A is a logical truth. Let |= A represent
the generality of logical truth A. Then |=s A expresses that the necessity of A is
general, i.e., |=s A⇔ |= A.
If a law of logic is understood to be expressed by a logical truth, then |= A
means that A is a law of logic. Thus, there is a sense in which laws of logic are
expressed by logical truths of the form A. If laws of logic are expressed by A,
then the failure of A implies the failure of the laws of logic. So, the fact that A
fails to be true for any A invokes the idea that there are no laws of logic. Thus, a
non-normal world introduced by Kripke can be characterised as a world where the
laws of logic fail. Just like a non-normal world of relevant logic, it is a logically
impossible world.
8Material contained in this section draws on Tanaka (2013).
9Lemmon (1957). For a discussion, see Hughes and Cresswell (1996).
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4 Logically Impossible Worlds vs. Worlds Where the Laws of
Logic are Different
Before we end our discussion about logically impossible worlds, let’s consider
an alternative characterisation that might be thought to define logically impossi-
ble worlds. Priest (2008) characterises a world where the laws of logic fail as
synonymous with a world where the laws of logic are different. For instance, he
writes:
non-normal worlds ... are worlds where the laws of logic are different.
Let us call these ‘logically impossible worlds’. (p. 171)
A little bit later he talks about a logically impossible world as a world ‘at which
logical laws fail’ (p. 172).
Priest elaborates on his characterisation of logically impossible worlds, worlds
where the laws of logic are different, in analogous to physically impossible worlds.
At a world where the laws of physics are different, objects might ‘accelerate past
the speed of light’ (p. 172). According to Priest, at such a world, the laws of
physics might permit physical objects to move differently from the physical laws
of ‘our’ world. Nevertheless, at that world, there are laws of physics. It is just that
they are different.
Now, Priest (1992) distinguishes the worlds where the laws of logic are dif-
ferent from the worlds where the laws of logic fail. However, he claims that the
non-normal worlds which are instrumental for invalidating A → (B → B) are
‘worlds where the laws of logic are different, not worlds where the logically im-
possible happens’ (p. 296). Logically impossible worlds defined in this paper are,
however, not the worlds where the laws of logic are different. What characterises
them is the failure of the laws of logic. At a non-normal world, logical truths of
the characteristic form (conditional in the case of relevant logics and necessary
statement in the case of modal logics) fail to hold. However, it is not that different
logical truths hold at a non-normal world. If A → B expresses a law of logic, it
is the failure of the conditional that defines a world being logically impossible. It
does not entail, however, that the non-normal world is part of the structure that
provides a different logical truth and the logical truth holds at that non-normal
world. No laws of logic hold at a non-normal world. So a logically impossible
world is a world where the laws of logic fail, but it is not a world where the laws
of logic are different.
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